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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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Abstract  
Providing system interoperability and evolving technologies in major DoD systems are 
two important acquisition challenges in preparing the military to meet current and future 
demands. The Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (ARCI) program successfully addressed many of 
the associated challenges. That program was studied as the basis for modeling the planned 
Rapid Capability Insertion Process (RCIP) approach for continuous, reduced-cost upgrading of 
assets. ARCI used atypical methods in the face of atypical program requirements and 
conditions. A previously developed acquisition program model was adapted to reflect ARCI and 
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used for model validation. This model was then changed to reflect the basic conditions expected 
to be faced by RCIP programs. The model demonstrated the potential of RCIP to significantly 
improve program performance. However, implementation risks are identified that may degrade 
potential performance, including increased oversight, the use of more new development, and 
the resulting integration scope and risk. When incorporated into the model, these risks were 
shown to significantly decrease RCIP performance. Means for successfully managing the RCIP 
design based on the ACRI program and RCIP operations are suggested for use in addressing 
the identified implementation risks. 
Introduction 
Providing system interoperability and evolving technologies in major DoD systems are 
two important acquisition challenges in preparing the military to meet current and future 
demands. The use of legacy and other weapons platforms, joint Service solutions, the 
information and communication needs of Network Centric Systems (NCS), and coordination 
with allies in joint operations require the development of weapons systems that can operate 
across system, platform, and systems-of-systems boundaries. Traditional DoD acquisition 
approaches do not fully provide the interoperability and development speed needed to meet 
these demands. The continued, and in some cases accelerating, evolution of technologies 
continuously creates new challenges that are difficult to forecast and require fast acquisition 
response. Threat matrices also evolve, changing the capabilities required to meet them. Short 
capability improvement cycle-times are needed to respond to these moving targets for 
acquisition efforts. The development of an Integrated Weapons System (IWS) for surface ships 
is an example of a major acquisition effort to provide system (and platform) interoperability and 
exploit technology evolution to meet changing threats. The current work focuses on acquisition 
approaches to meet these challenges.  
Naval Open Architecture (OA) (DAU, 2009) is a breakthrough acquisition approach that 
develops and facilitates the use of acquisition processes, which integrate interoperable systems 
that evolve with technologies, threats, and program environments (e.g., funding). OA does this 
through five principles: 1) modular design and design disclosure, 2) reusable application 
software, 3) interoperable joint warfighting applications and secure information exchange, 4) 
lifecycle affordability, and 5) encouraging competition and collaboration through the 
development of alternative solutions and sources. Evolutionary Acquisition (EA) (DAU, 2009) is 
a somewhat recently developed acquisition approach that uses the repeated integration of only 
mature-enough technologies into products to speed capability improvement for warfighters. OA 
and EA can act synergistically to meet their objectives. However, effective implementation is 
critical for success. Particularly in large, complex systems that span platforms, the successful 
implementation of OA and EA is not obvious or easy.  
Despite their potential, OA and EA have not yet been fully developed or implemented in 
DoD acquisition. Previous research (Ford & Dillard, 2008; Dillard & Ford, 2007) suggests that 
the DoD can successfully integrate open systems and Evolutionary Acquisition. This supports 
the Navy’s current development of the Rapid Capability Insertion Process (RCIP) to implement 
Open Architecture and Evolutionary Acquisition (described later). The Navy’s Acoustic Rapid 
COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) Insertion program (ARCI) experience (described later) 
demonstrates that these approaches can be integrated and applied successfully. An improved 
understanding of how OA and EA have been used successfully and can be used in RCIP is 
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The Research Approach  
Evolutionary Acquisition and open systems approaches combine to create a complex set 
of development processes that evolve over time. An improved understanding of these 
processes and their management is available through formal modeling of the most important 
components and relationships that drive system performance and risk. Due to the number and 
complexity of the components and their relationships, the formal model structure and rigor of 
calculations can simulate and forecast performance and risk better than informal, tacit 
predictions by humans. Therefore, we applied a computational experimentation approach to 
investigating Evolutionary Acquisition and open systems projects, integrating theory and 
practice in a computational tool that allows controlled experimentation through simulation.   
Previous research and modeling of Open Architecture and Evolutionary Acquisition is 
being used as the foundation of the current work. That model was first revised and improved to 
reflect the ARCI program to develop a basis for understanding success factors in OA and EA 
implementation. This required the development of a deep understanding of the relevant aspects 
of the ARCI acquisition program (summarized next). The ACRI model was then revised to 
reflect the Rapid Capability Insertion Process. Model analysis was used to better understand the 
requirements for success in RCIP.  
The System Dynamics Modeling Methodology 
The system dynamics methodology was applied to model the ARCI program. System 
dynamics is one of several established and successful approaches to systems analysis and 
design (Flood & Jackson, 1991; Lane & Jackson, 1995; Jackson, 2003). The methodology has 
been extensively used for this purpose, including to study several aspects of development 
projects. System dynamics shares many fundamental systems concepts with other systems 
approaches, including emergence, control, and layered structures. Therefore, system dynamics 
can address issues such as risk in large complex systems such as the DoD acquisition projects 
(Lane, Größler & Milling, 2004). The methodology’s ability to model many diverse system 
components (e.g., work, people, money, information), processes (e.g., design, technology 
development, quality assurance, rework), and managerial decision-making and actions (e.g., 
forecasting, resource allocation) makes it useful for investigating acquisition programs. Forrester 
(1961) develops the methodology's philosophy, and Sterman (2000) specifies the modeling 
process with examples and describes numerous applications.  
The system dynamics methodology applies a control theory perspective to the design 
and management of complex human systems. The perspective focuses on how the internal 
structure of a system impacts managerial behavior and performance over time. The system 
dynamics approach is unique in its integrated use of stocks and flows, causal feedback, and 
time delays to model structures and policies. Stocks represent accumulations or backlogs of 
work, people, information, or other portions of the system that change over time. Flows 
represent the movement of those commodities into, between, and out of stocks. For example, 
Figure 1 shows a simple stock and flow diagram of one possible arrangement of the backlogs 
and movements of work within a single activity (e.g., Advanced Development) of an acquisition 
program. Stocks are represented by boxes. Flows are represented by arrows between the 






























Figure 1. A Stock and Flow Diagram of Work Backlogs and Development Activities 
Feedback is modeled conceptually in system dynamics with causal loop diagrams. 
Figure 2 shows a portion of a causal loop diagram for a single activity of an acquisition program. 
In causal loop diagrams, arrows indicate the direction of causal influence. The variable at the tail 
of an arrowhead influences the variable at the head of the arrow. A plus sign at an arrowhead 
indicates that the impacted variable and driving variable move in the same direction (i.e., an 
increase in the driving variable increases the impacted variable, and a decrease in the driving 
variable decreases the impacted variable). A negative sign at an arrowhead indicates that the 
impacted variable and driving variable move in opposite directions (i.e., an increase in the 
driving variable decreases the impacted variable, and a decrease in the driving variable 
increases the impacted variable). The two types of feedback loops are also illustrated in Figure 
2. A balancing loop (“B” in Figure 2) tends to control or limit the movement of the variables in the 
loop. In contrast, a reinforcing loop (“R” in Figure 2) tends to move systems farther and farther 
from their initial conditions at faster and faster speeds. The behavior pattern generated by a 
specific feedback loop (e.g., exponential growth or movement toward a target) can be identified 
by sequentially tracing these impacts on variables through the series of causal links that 
describe the loop. See Sterman (2000) for a detailed description of the building and use of 
causal loop diagrams.  
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Feedback Loop Legend 
B – Rework backlog increases rework rate, controlling the size of the backlog 
R – Poor quality rework increases the work fraction requiring rework and rework backlog, further 
increasing the amount of work requiring rework 
 
Figure 2. A Causal Loop Diagram of a Portion of an Advanced Development Phase  
Stock and flow diagrams and causal loop diagrams can be integrated into system 
structure diagrams that simultaneously describe the feedback and accumulation/flow nature of 
the system being modeled. Figure 3 shows a system structure diagram of a model of an 
acquisition program phase. The diagram integrates the stock and flow diagram in Figure 1, the 
causal loop diagram in Figure 2, and some of the other important portions of the system. The 






























































Feedback Loop Legend (partial) 
B1 – An increase in the Initial Design Backlog increases the initial design rate, thereby 
controlling the backlog 
B2 – An increase in the Quality Assurance (QA) Backlog increases the QA rate and 
discovery of rework, thereby controlling the backlog 
B1 – An increase in the Quality Assurance (QA) Backlog increases the QA rate and 
design approval rate, thereby controlling the backlog 
B4 – An increase in the Rework Backlog increases the rework rate, thereby controlling 
the backlog 
B5 – An increase in the accumulation of approved designs increases the size of the 
design release, thereby controlling the Approved Design accumulation 
B6 – An increase in the Quality Assurance (QA) Backlog increases the QA rate, 
discovery of rework, fraction discovered, and approval rate, thereby controlling the 
backlog 
R1 – An increase in the Quality Assurance (QA) Backlog increases the QA rate, 
discovery of rework, Rework Backlog, and rework rate, thereby increasing the QA 
Backlog further  
R2 – An increase in the rework rate increases the fraction requiring rework, fraction 
discovered, discovery rate, and Rework Backlog, thereby increasing the rework rate 
further.  
 
Figure 3. A System Structure Diagram of a Portion of Advanced Development 
The full power of system dynamics can be realized only through formal simulation of the 
system’s evolution. Formal simulation models developed from conceptual models are sets of 
nonlinear differential equations simulated with difference equations. Because no closed-form 
solutions are known, system behaviors over time are simulated. The simulator uses initial or 
current conditions, calibration values of constant parameters, and the difference equations to 
calculate conditions in the nest time period. Although the methodology initially assumes that 
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small changes over time can be used to describe systems (e.g., the continuous adjustment of 
resources toward demands for those resources); however, discrete changes (e.g., the release 
of a complete design) at specific dates (e.g., a scheduled upgrade date) can also be modeled.  
When applied to development projects, system dynamics focuses on how performance 
evolves in response to interactions among development strategy (e.g., Evolutionary Acquisition 
versus traditional acquisition), managerial decision-making (e.g., the allocation of resources), 
and development processes (e.g., concurrence). System dynamics is considered appropriate for 
modeling acquisition programs because of its ability to explicitly model critical aspects of 
development projects (Ford & Sterman, 1998; Cooper, 1993a, September; 1993b, September; 
1993c; Cooper & Mullen, 1993; Cooper, 1994). System dynamics has been successfully applied 
to a variety of project management issues, including prediction/discovery of failures in project 
fast-track implementation (Ford & Sterman, 2003b, September), poor schedule performance 
(Abdel-Hamid, 1988; Taylor & Ford, 2006; 2008), the impacts of changes (Rodriguez & 
Williams, 1998; Cooper, 1980), the planning of fast-track construction projects (Pena-Mora & Li, 
2001; Pena-Mora & Park, 2001), construction innovation (Park, Napa & Dulaimi, 2004), change 
management (Lee, Pena-Mora & Park, 2005; 2006; Park & Pena-Mora, 2003), resource 
allocation (Lee et al., 2007), and concealing rework requirements  on project performance (Ford 
& Sterman, 2003a, September). See Lyneis and Ford (2007) for a review and analysis of the 
application of system dynamics to projects.  
The ARCI Program  
Information on the ARCI program was collected as the basis for modeling the OA and 
EA aspects of its acquisition process. In particular, differences between ARCI and traditional 
acquisition with an evolutionary approach were investigated. Data was collected primarily 
through a review of Navy documents (Johnson, 2007; Chief of Naval Operations, 2009), 
contractor program documents (Lockheed Martin, 2003; 2009), defense analyst documents 
(Global Security, n.d.), previous research concerning the program (e.g., Beaudreau, 2006; 
Johnson, 2004), and an extended interview with Bill Johnson, who developed and managed the 
ARCI program (Johnson, 2009). The data collection focused on the acquisition (development) 
aspects of ARCI. A summary of the results of that data collection follow.  
Although it occurred within the established DoD acquisition processes of its time, the 
ARCI program was atypical in several important ways. The description here focuses on the 
program’s atypical nature, as it relates to the current work. See Beaudreau (2006) and Johnson 
(2004) for additional program descriptions. Three atypical aspects of the ARCI program in 
particular generated the need for and prompted the use of a new and different acquisition 
approach: 1) the urgent operational need, 2) tight constraints on funding, and 3) an environment 
of acquisition reform.  
An Urgent Operational Need  
In September of 1995, the Submarine Sonar Technology Panel reported a serious 
reduction in acoustic superiority. The reduced superiority resulted in reductions in the “stand off” 
distance between US submarines and other vessels (particularly other submarines), the 
distance at which US submarines recognize other vessels. The standoff distance is determined 
by the noise radiated from vessels and the capabilities of the recognizing ship through its sonar 
systems. Although the radiated noise of other vessels had progressively reduced (Figures 4 and 
5), US sonar capabilities had not progressed in-step. Improved sonar systems could recapture 
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the lost acoustic superiority. Importantly, the acoustic superiority loss had already occurred by 
1995, and the need to regain it was considered urgent by the operating submarine fleet. ARCI 
needed to develop solutions fast. Figures 4 and 5 are examples of data used to support these 
findings and recommendations.  













































































Figure 5. Diesel Rated Noise Trend 
(Johnson, 2007) 
 
Based on these findings, the Submarine Sonar Technology Panel recommended a 
radical transformation of the approach to designing and fielding sonar systems. 
 =
=
==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå======== - 215 - 
=
=
Tight Constraints on Funding  
By 1995, the Cold War was over and funding for the DoD acquisition had reduced 






















































































































































Figure 7. Combat Control Development Funding 
(Johnson, 2007) 
Å ARCI need reported 
Å ARCI need reported 
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Traditional acquisition approaches, such as the development of unique systems for one 
or more sonar systems, were not available due to the large funding requirements of these 
approaches.  ARCI had to develop solutions relatively inexpensively, at much less cost than 
required by the traditional DoD acquisition approaches.  
An Environment of Acquisition Reform   
Although not a characteristic of the ARCI program itself, the DoD acquisition processes 
were evolving faster than usual during the period in which ARCI began. This had potentially 
significant impacts on the program in terms of allowing it more than the usual amount of 
freedom to pursue and develop innovative acquisition perspectives, methods, and tools. These 
potential impacts are investigated later in the current work.  
The ARCI Program Results   
The ARCI program succeeded in significantly improving US submarine sonar systems 






























































































































Mean Operator Detection 
Success Rate
Mean # of False Alarms 
Per Run
Mean Initial Detection & 
Classification Time
(When Detection Occurred)




9 Min Earlier 27 Min EarlierBaseline
10 Min Longer 25 Min LongerBaseline
Improved by a Factor of ~ 4
False Alarms Reduced by 40%
Improved by 27 Minutes
Improved by 25 Minutes*
* Measured holding time limited by the length of recorded tape.  
Figure 9. Towed Array Processing Performance-improvement Trend 
(Johnson, 2007) 
ARCI performed quickly. Phase I improvements were installed on Agusta in December 
of 1997, and performance improvements delivered 18 months after the MDA decision. By the 
eighth anniversary of the ARCI MDA decision in June of 2004, ARCI had installed on over 50 
submarines with at least four generations of hardware and software upgrades. These durations 
are much shorter than those in most comparable acquisition programs.  
In addition to improving sonar system performance, ARCI generated large cost savings 
(Johnson, 2007) by reducing budget allocations across SCN, OPN, O&MN, RDT&E, and MilCon 
by over 50% ($7.6 billion to $3.6 billion) when the 1983-1993 budget allocations are compared 
to the 1996-2006 allocations. These savings reflect a reduction in Development and Production 
by a factor of six and a reduction in Operating and Support costs by a factor of eight. ARCI also 
realized over $25 million in cost avoidance for logistics support, including:   
 Over $1 million in technical manuals, 
 Over $2 million in direct vendor delivery, 
 Over $19 million in interactive, multimedia instruction, and 
 $3 million in outfitting spares reduction. 
In summary, ARCI was an extremely successful acquisition program. A fundamental 
question for learning how to improve other acquisition programs is “Why was ARCI so 
successful?” Several factors, internal to the program and from its environment, help explain this 
success. Beaudreau (2006) focused on the role of the Modular Open Systems Approach 
(MOSA), now incorporated into the Navy’s Open Architecture approach, changing culture, and 
systems engineering (including spiral development, now termed Evolutionary Acquisition). The 
current work focuses on the dynamic nature of the ARCI program and what that nature suggests 
about the successful implementation of acquisition programs.   
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Open Architecture and Evolutionary Acquisition in the ARCI 
Program  
ARCI was created in the early 1990s in an unusual acquisition environment that was 
dominated by an urgent need for significant improvement in active fleet capabilities, very 
constrained funding, and ongoing acquisition reforms. More specifically, submarine sonar 
hardware and software needed large improvements in performance. Complete solutions were 
not available and ready for operational testing when ARCI began. The need to develop solutions 
and make improvements quickly required an evolutionary approach. In addition, existing 
capabilities used legacy systems, which made repeated and fast changes difficult and 
expensive. Moving away from the legacy systems to an Open Architecture system potentially 
provided the flexibility needed for frequent upgrades as technologies developed. Program 
managers initially planned to replace legacy hardware with COTS (a central tenant of OA) to 
take advantage of the increased computing capability of hardware developed since the original 
system development and to facilitate future upgrades. Reduced hardware size provided space 
for the redesign of cabinets, etc. so that COTS products would meet military reliability 
requirements not met by those products “out of the box.” ARCI managers originally planned to 
write middleware to link the new hardware and legacy software. However, analysis revealed that 
rewriting the operating software in a modern software platform (C++) was less expensive than 
developing middleware and also provided opportunities for an Open Architecture for software 
upgrades. Therefore, the Open Architecture approach was expanded to include software. Four 
acquisition iterations were initially designed (a central tenant of EA), each to address a different 
portion of the sonar system: 1) the towed array, 2) the hull array,1 3) the spherical array, and 4) 
the high frequency arrays. Each iteration used the standard DoD acquisition phases at the time 
of the program that identified and specified requirements, acquired technologies, designed and 
developed products, and integrated those solutions into ships.  
As described so far, ARCI was a straightforward (albeit challenging) integration of Open 
Architecture and Evolutionary Acquisition. However, the ARCI program included some important 
features that distinguish it from known descriptions of the implementation of open systems and 
Evolutionary Acquisition. First, consider the dynamic nature of the need (evolving threats) and 
solutions (technology evolution). As hardware and software technologies improved and threats 
evolved, additional ARCI iterations would be needed. Improvements would be needed on an 
almost continuous basis to adequately improve fleet performance. Therefore, ARCI needed to 
be able to generate many repeatable capability upgrade iterations. This required ARCI to 
develop a process that integrated continuous processes with phased development, Open 
Architecture, and Evolutionary Acquisition. This was done partially by setting frequent upgrade 
release dates and not letting those dates slip. The first iteration was released 18 months after 
the identification of initial requirements, with subsequent upgrades every 12 months. This is 
much more frequent than the common DoD practice. The frequent integration of improvements 
was possible only by utilizing many previously developed technologies and solutions from a 
variety of sources (e.g., ONR, small businesses, academics). “Leverage, leverage, leverage” 
was a mantra in ARCI that referred to the program’s emphasis on the use of existing 
technologies and solutions.  
                                                
1 Some towed array upgrades were included in some of the second (hull array) iterations to respond to 
the fleet’s overwhelming support based on the results of initial towed array improvement results and the 
fleet’s urgent need for improvement.  
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ARCI completed frequent upgrades through a second important difference between 
ARCI and other OA and EA programs that is related to the relationship of requirements, 
technologies, products, and implementation to specific acquisition iterations. Traditional DoD 
acquisition (including traditional EA) strongly link specific requirements to specific development 
blocks at the start of the block. Tests for specific blocks can be failed if the requirements linked 
to that block are not met and development is slowed to be sure that promised requirements are 
included.2  Strongly linking requirements to blocks before solutions have been developed 
requires a flexible schedule—in case of development problems—lots of money to speed 
development, or both. ARCI had little flexibility of time or money, so it made requirements 
flexible to meet iteration deadlines (i.e., the commitments to upgrade at specific intervals) and 
control costs. This was done with a combination of a deviation from the traditional acquisition 
process and the use of a different conceptualization and utilization of several acquisition 
processes. ARCI delayed the selection of technologies and products to be included in each 
iteration until as late as possible (typically, about six months before delivery) and only included 
(at the program manager’s discretion) those improvements for which developed technologies 
and solutions were available and in-hand. Requirements for which solutions were not yet 
available were delayed until solutions had been developed. ARCI is distinguished from many 
other DoD programs by its ability to locate the authority to include or delay meeting 
requirements with the program managers. According to the program manager, this was 
accepted by the fleet largely because the frequent iterations provided an opportunity for delays 
in meeting requirements to be relatively short, and solutions were being developed relatively 
rapidly.  
ARCI managers also adopted a fundamentally different mental model of the acquisition 
process than was described in the DoD policy at the time of the program (e.g., 5000.1) and 
extended concepts that are described in current policy (USD (AT&L), 2003b, May 12, sections 1 
and 2, pp. 12-13). Current policy describes sequential acquisition phases (Materiel Solution 
Analysis, Technology Development, and Engineering and Manufacturing Development) that are 
repeated after requirements are developed, with continuous technology development and 
maturation (USD (AT&L), 2003b, May 12, Figure 2). In contrast, ARCI used continuous 
requirements development, technology development, and advanced development. Only the six-
month implementation phases (analogous to Manufacturing Development) were viewed as 
specific to individual upgrades. This, and the Open Architecture approach to solutions, required 
ARCI to aggressively pursue and actively manage and coordinate continuous and parallel 
requirements revision, technology identification and development, and product development. 
This approach (three continuous processes and one iteration-based phase) is fundamentally 
different than traditional acquisition (all iteration-based phases) or current policy (one 
continuous process and several iteration-based phases). This approach also required a different 
set of government and contractor skills and relationships.  
ARCI changed important relationships among program participants. The prime 
contractor was forced to take a role of primarily providing coordination but not generating 
solutions. This was to prevent solution bias in choosing technologies and products for inclusion 
in upgrades. Solutions were developed by multiple and diverse organizations (e.g., academia, 
ONR, small businesses) and chosen based on transparent assessments by an objective team 
                                                
2 This may be part of why traditional EA is difficult to plan. Program managers must successfully predict 
which requirements will be filled through future technology development, product design, and 
implementation when they commit to meet specific requirements for specific development blocks, often 
long before that technology and product development has occurred or can be reliably forecasted.   
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of experts. This successfully prevented purposeful or accidental sole-source acquisition by 
providing suppliers that were not awarded contracts with realistic opportunities to fairly compete 
and potentially win future ARCI work. These changes required several atypical program 
management skills.  
Modeling the ARCI Program  
The simulation model used here is based on a previously developed formal (i.e., 
computer simulation) system dynamics model of a DoD acquisition project using Evolutionary 
Acquisition and some aspects of open systems. The model is purposefully simple relative to 
actual practice to expose the relevant relationships, with a focus on the open systems and 
Evolutionary Acquisition aspects. Therefore, although many development processes and 
features of program participants interact to determine program performance, only those features 
that describe the critical evolutionary, Open Architecture, and ARCI-specific nature of the 
program are included. For example, the model assumes that resource productivities are fixed, 
that work backlogs are available for development, and that work packages are completed in 
accordance with schedule requirements (i.e., work packages on the critical path are completed 
first) but does not identify specific critical-path work packages. The literature cited above 
investigates the impacts of these and other factors influencing program performance. The model 
generates complex and realistic behavior patterns despite its relative simplicity when compared 
to the actual DoD acquisition programs. A brief description of the conceptual model that was 
used as the basis for the formal model provides a foundation for describing the current model of 
ARCI. See Ford and Dillard (2008) for a detailed description of the previous model.   
A Conceptual Model of an Evolutionary Acquisition Program 
The model structure reflects the structure of development work moving through the 
separate development blocks of an acquisition project. In the model, four types of work flow 
through each block of an acquisition project: requirements, technologies, product component 
designs, and manufactured products. Each type of work flows through a development phase 
that completes a critical aspect of the project: 1) develop requirements, 2) develop technologies, 
3) design product components (advanced development), and 4) manufacture products. The 
exception is requirements, which also measures progress through the final phase, 5) conduct 
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Milestones A B DRR C FRP
Time Periods 
 
Figure 10. Information Flows in a Single-block Acquisition Project 
(Ford & Dillard, 2008) 
In Figure 10, arrows between phases indicate primary information flows. The start of all 
phases (except the development of requirements) is constrained by the completion of previous 
(“upstream”) phases. These constraints are relaxed in the ARCI model to reflect continuous 
development phases. In the previous model, the completion of some requirements allows for the 
start of technology development, reflecting the concurrent nature of this portion of acquisition. 
Both requirements development and technology development must be completed for advanced 
development to begin. The completion of advanced development allows manufacturing to begin. 
When some products have been manufactured, they are shipped to users for readiness testing. 
Figure 10 also identifies the five major reviews within a single acquisition block (A, B, Design 
Readiness Review, C, and Full-rate Production) at their approximate times during a project.   
Each of the five phases in a development block (shown in Figure 10) are modeled with 
the workflows through the phase as a value chain of alternating backlogs and development 
activities with two types of rework cycle (within phases and between phases). The value chain is 
described with the boxes and pipes and with valves along the bottom of Figure 11. The value 
chain passes from the Initial Completion Backlog, through the Initial Completion Rate, into the 
Quality Assurance Backlog, through the Approval Rate, into the stock of Work Approved, and 
through the Release Rate to the accumulation of Work Finished and Released. Rework cycles 
are inherent in development projects and have been modeled and used extensively to explain 
and improve project management (Lyneis, Cooper, & Els, 2001; Ford & Sterman, 1998; Cooper 
& Mullen, 1993; Cooper, 1980; 1993a, February; 1993b, February; 1993c; 1994; Taylor & Ford, 
2006; 2008). The scope of work is measured with the number of equal-sized work packages 








Figure 11. Work Backlogs and Flows through a Development Phase 
For most phases in most blocks, all work starts in the backlog3 of work needing to be 
initially completed (“Initial Completion Backlog” box at the bottom of Figure 11). The ARCI 
project includes an exception, which will be described later. As work is first completed, it enters 
the stock of work needing quality assurance (QA). Quality assurance could take many forms, 
including reviews of designs by senior engineers, prototype building and testing, and the 
inspection of work. Work needing quality assurance accumulates in a Quality Assurance 
Backlog (the box in the middle of Figure 11).  If work passes QA (either because it is correct or 
the need for changes is not detected), it is approved and adds to the stock of Work Approved. 
When sufficient work has been approved, a package is released, adding to the stock of Work 
Finished and Released to other phases or users. The release package size is a management 
decision, often based on the characteristics of the phase. For example, in semiconductor 
development, the vast majority of the design code must be completed prior to release for a 
prototype build since almost all of the code is needed to design the masks. In other 
development settings, managers have broad discretion in setting release package sizes.  
In rework cycles, between-phases work that is found to require changes moves into a 
stock of tasks that require changes that must be resolved through coordination with the phase 
responsible for the problem (“Coordination Backlog”). Classic examples include designers 
working with users to refine ambiguous or infeasible requirements or manufacturing engineers 
meeting with product designers to explain why parts can’t be built as specified in the drawings. 
After coordination resolves the disputed issues, these tasks move to the stock of work known to 
need rework (“Known Rework Backlog”) and are subsequently reworked and returned to quality 
assurance for re-inspection, testing, etc.  
Since quality assurance is imperfect, some tasks requiring rework can be missed and 
erroneously approved and released. These rework requirements may be discovered later by 
another work phase. We assume that all defects are discovered in final product testing by users. 
When the phase that discovers the problem reports it, the generating phase is notified, and the 
affected tasks are moved from the stock of work considered finished to the coordination backlog 
                                                
3 Because the flows of development activities reflect the completion of the activity, the backlogs, as used 
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and then eventually reworked. For example, a test phase may discover a short circuit across 
two layers in a prototype chip. If the error is traced to the design, test engineers must notify the 
designers and work with them to specify the location and characteristics of the short circuit. The 
designers must then rework, re-check and re-release the design, followed by changes in layout, 
tape-out, masking, and prototype fabrication.  
The previous model of Open Architecture and Evolutionary Acquisition simulated the 
movement of work through an acquisition program. That model linked all five phases to specific 
iterations, which were completed at different intervals (Figure 10). Figure 12 depicts an 
acquisition project with multiple iterations or blocks. The first block is the same as Figure 10 
above. Subsequent blocks have the same basic information flow, but can also be delayed by 
the completion of phases in previous blocks or constrained by the lack of progress in their own 
block.  






Milestones, Iter #1 A1 B1 DRR1 C1 FRP1
Milestones, Iter #2 A2 B2 DRR2 C2 FRP2
Milestones, Iter #3 A3 B3 DRR3 C3 FRP3
Time Periods 
 
Figure 12. Information Flows in a Three-block Acquisition Project 
(Ford & Dillard, 2008) 
Modeling Open Systems in an Evolutionary Acquisition Program 
The previous simulation model reflected some important aspects of open systems by 
changing model parameters to reflect impacts of open systems suggested by the literature. As 
an example, Table 1 describes some of the open systems impacts derived from Meyers and 
Oberndorf (2001) that were incorporated into the model.   
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Table 1. Impacts of Open Systems on Evolutionary Acquisition Due to Changes 
Suggested by Meyers and Oberndorf (2001) 
(Ford & Dillard, 2008) 
Change Required by  
Open Systems Impact on Evolutionary Acquisition Processes 
1) Build standards & COTS for 
program use 
Increases Requirements scope in Block 1 
Increases Technology Development scope in Block 1 
2) Build high-level model with open 
systems 
Increases Technology Development scope in Block 1 
3) Document use of OS Increases Technology Development scope in all blocks 
4) Coordinate standards Increases scope of all phases in all blocks 
5) Implement OS Decreases Advanced Development scope in all blocks 
Fewer Advanced Development design problems in all blocks 
6) Integrate components More Advanced Development integration problems in all blocks 
More Manufacturing integration problems in all blocks 
 
Model Changes to Reflect the ARCI Program 
The structure of the simulation model of a traditional acquisition program that adopts 
Open Architecture and Evolutionary Acquisition approaches was changed to better reflect the 
ARCI program. The primary changes are:  
 Rename “Advanced Development” as “Design” to reflect the broader acquisition 
approach to this phase in ARCI that often adopted existing solutions instead of 
developing new solutions such as is often done in many traditional programs.   
 Rename the “Manufacturing” phase to the “Integration” phase to reflect the nature of 
this activity in ARCI.  
 Model the Requirements, Technology, and Design phases as a single, continuous 
development activity that occurs throughout the program.  
 Begin the program with a set of initially developed requirements to be addressed but 
no inflow of new requirements. This reflects the conditions at the beginning of the 
program and the nature of the needs that the program was addressing (i.e., largely 
understood and described).  
 Model the Integration activity as separate phases (as in the previous model), but 
start those phases at specific times (6 months before release), and end them at 
specific Integration release dates.   
 Fix Integration release dates at 1.5 years after the program start (MDA) for the first 
release and then annually thereafter (i.e., at weeks 78, 130, 182, and 234).  
 Disaggregate supplier-resource types into three types, reflecting those addressing 
technology acquisition, design, and implementation. The resources include several 
types of suppliers: contractors, ONR, government labs, and academic agencies. 
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Resources-for-requirements was not separately modeled because the requirements 
were largely already developed at the start of the program, and resources for 
checking and revising requirements was not considered by the program manager to 
constrain program progress.  
 Disaggregate government program-management resources into three types, 
reflecting the same three types of resources as supplier modeling: technology, 
design, and integration work.  
Little specific data was available for model parameter estimates. Therefore, the ARCI 
model was calibrated using data collected through the interview with the program manager and 



























1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250
Time (weeks)
Work Approved[Requirements,Iter1] : ARCI work packages1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Work Approved[Technology,Iter1] : ARCI work packages2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Work Approved[Design,Iter1] : ARCI work packages3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Integration work approved : ARCI work packages4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  
Figure 13. Approved Work in the Simulated ARCI Program  
The vertical axis in Figure 13 is work packages, as described above. Figure 13 reflects 
the critical behavior patterns that describe the ARCI program. Work for each upgrade 
progresses first through the checking and revision (as required) of requirements (blue line #1 in 
Figure 13), subsequent acquisition of technologies to fulfill those requirements (red line #2 in 
Figure 13), and design of upgrade solutions using those technologies (green line #3 in Figure 
13). As in the ARCI program, these continue throughout all upgrades (weeks 0–250 in Figure 
13). But the accumulation of mature-enough requirements, technologies, and designs for each 
upgrade are collected at weeks 52, 104, and 156 (6 months before each release) to initiate the 
Integration phase for the upgrade. The four Integration phases (grey line #4 in Figure 13) each 
last six months and end at the release of each upgrade package to the fleet for operational 
testing and use. Consistent with ACRI, the revision of requirements, acquisition of technologies, 
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and design of solutions does not stop during integration but continues, as show in Figure 13 by 
the overlapping of the progress rate lines during the Integration phases.   
The ARCI model was tested for its usefulness for investigating implementation issues. 
Standard model tests as described by Sterman (2000) were used, including testing both the 
model structure and behavior. The model is based on previously developed system dynamics 
models of product development in several industries that have been developed and tested over 
several decades, as described and referenced above. Model structure was tested for similarity 
to the structure of the actual system through one-to-one linking of model components and 
specific parts of the system structure and units-consistency checks. Models were tested for their 
ability to generate “the right behavior patterns for the right reasons” (i.e., for the same reasons 
as in the actual system) using extreme-conditions testing and the comparison of simulated 
behavior patterns with an understanding of the behavior of the actual and similar systems. In 
extreme-conditions testing, one or more model parameter values are set to represent extreme 
conditions, which the modeler can use to predict correct model behavior. For example, the 
extreme condition of no resources should generate a program with no progress. The ARCI 
model generated reasonable behavior over a wide range of parameter values. The model 
behavior is similar to the described project behaviors, also supporting the model’s ability to 
reflect the relevant portions of the ARCI program. Based on these tests, the model was 
considered useful for investigating RCIP implementation issues.   
Modeling RCIP  
The Rapid Capability Insertion Process (RCIP) seeks to develop a process that can 
capture the types of performance improvements realized by ARCI in more and larger acquisition 
programs. The upgrading of AEGIS and its preparation for net-centric warfare is a potential 
application of RCIP. RCIP is based on the ARCI program and includes its core concepts and 
changes from most traditional acquisition projects, including those that adopt the Open 
Architecture and Evolutionary Acquisition approaches. However, based on an interview with one 
of the RCIP developers (2009), there will be differences between ARCI and RCIP, primarily: 
 RCIP will be applied to larger acquisition efforts (e.g., AEGIS);  
 After an initial start-up phase, RCIP will receive and develop a continuous stream of 
new requirements instead of having a fixed set of established requirements in place, 
as ACRI had; 
 RCIP is initially planned to release upgrades to the fleet every two years, thereby 
adopting a cycle that is twice as long as that used in ARCI; and 
 RCIP is planned to use 12-month integration periods, twice as long as those in ARCI. 
These differences were integrated into the simulation model to provide an estimate of 
the potential of the RCIP approach. This represents a simple (and simplistic, as will be 
explained) scaling of the ACRI approach to RCIP. Figure 14 shows RCIP’s potential 
performance. Steady-state output exceeds the ARCI’s average output, although ARCI’s 








































0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
Time (weeks)
Work Approved[Requirements,Iter1] : RCIP Opportunity work packages1 1 1 1 1 1
Work Approved[Technology,Iter1] : RCIP Opportunity work packages2 2 2 2 2 2
Work Approved[Design,Iter1] : RCIP Opportunity work packages3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Integration work approved : RCIP Opportunity work packages4 4 4 4 4 4 4  
Figure 14. Simulated RCIP Program Behavior 
Figure 14 includes the fundamental, desired behavior of RCIP, a basically continuous 
process of requirements development upgrades (after an initial start-up phase). While useful as 
a benchmark for the current work, important risks must be addressed to better reflect the RCIP 
approach.  
The RCIP Implementation Risks 
A simple scaling-up of the ARCI program into an RCIP program will not capture the 
potential performance (especially considering that the model above is simplistic) because it 
ignores important implementation risks that can degrade RCIP performance when compared to 
its potential. In addition to the changes from ARCI to RCIP listed above, several implementation 
challenges pose risks that may affect RCIP, including: 1), an increased pool of suppliers due to 
increased scale, 2) a reduced number of off-the-shelf technologies and designs available for 
use, resulting in a need for more new development, and 3) increased systems that solutions 
must be integrated across. Table 2 contrasts the three acquisition programs to highlight their 
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Table 2. Contrasts among Traditional Phased, ARCI, and RCIP Acquisition Programs 
Acquisition Feature Phased 
Program with 















with continuous inflow 
of requirements  
Innovation sources Primarily through 
Prime Contractor  
Primarily Off-the-shelf 
solutions 
Mix of new development 





across phases & 
development blocks 
Primarily separate 
systems (towed, hull, 
spherical, high 
frequency) 






Prime contractor “Prime” coordinator & 
multiple solution 
suppliers 
Larger solution supplier 
pool 
Primary Locus of 
Performance Flexibility 
Cost, Schedule Scope Scope with possible 
flexibility in cost 
 
The Primary Locus of Program Flexibility (the last row in Table 2) describes a generic 
model of program management that can partially explain the ARCI success and facilitate the 
design and management of RCIP programs. The model describes how program management 
handles, in practice, the ubiquitous circumstances of having inadequate resources (broadly 
defined) to meet all performance targets (e.g., cost <= budget, completion date <= deadline, 
capabilities >= warfighter needs). In these circumstances, program management is forced to 
select one or more performance dimensions that will not meet targets and project by how much 
they will underperform. The dimension or dimensions that are chosen is the Primary Locus of 
Program Performance Flexibility. A common saying among commercial contractors (although 
perhaps not said to their clients) that captures the essence of this model is “Fast, cheap, good. 
Pick two.” Table 2 identifies the Primary Locus of Performance Flexibility as a significant 
difference between traditional programs with Open Architecture and Evolutionary Acquisition 
and programs adopting the ARCI/RCIP approach. In the former, performance flexibility is 
primarily located in the cost and schedule dimensions. In contrast, in the ARCI program, it was 
in the scope included in the current upgrade. In the RCIP approach, it is expected to remain in 
the scope dimension, with the possibility that cost may also provide some flexibility.  
The RCIP’s expected implementation risks were integrated into the simulation model. 
Specifically:  
 Increased scope is expected to attract increased oversight and, therefore, reduce 
productivity due to the use of resources (primarily labor) in the preparations for 
reviews, etc. (20% reduction estimated).  
 Existing inventories of requirements, off-the-shelf technologies, and off-the-shelf 
designs were reduced by 50% to reflect the need for more new development. This 
will require their initial development in addition to the testing and revisions included in 
the ARCI model.  
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  Increased new development will also require more integration effort than off-the-
shelf solutions, which have already been partially developed for integration upon 
adoption. Therefore, the amount of integration work was increased by 25%.  
  Increased new development will also make integration more difficult than off-the-
shelf solutions, which have been partially tested for integration upon adoption. 
Therefore, the amount of iteration required in the integration phases was increased 
by 25%.  
Figure 15 shows the simulated RCIP program with implementation risks. The program 






























1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
Time (weeks)
Work Approved[Requirements,Iter1] : RCIP Challenges work packages1 1 1 1 1 1
Work Approved[Technology,Iter1] : RCIP Challenges work packages2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Work Approved[Design,Iter1] : RCIP Challenges work packages3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Integration work approved : RCIP Challenges work packages4 4 4 4 4 4 4  
Figure 15. Simulated RCIP with Implementation Challenges 
Implications of Implementation Risks for RCIP Success 
The work completed and released to the fleet when RCIP implementation risks are 
considered (Figure 15) is significantly less than the potential (Figure 14). Figure 16 illustrates 
this difference (about 14% in the simulated program) by accumulating the Integration phase 
work released across four upgrades, without (blue line #1) and with (red line #2) implementation 
risks included. RCIP implementation risks must be addressed to capture the full potential of the 




















0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
Time (Week)
Project Integration Work Released : RCIP Opportunity work packages1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Project Integration Work Released : RCIP Challenges work packages2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  
Figure 16. Cumulative RCIP Performance without and with  
Implementation Issues 
Another RCIP implementation risk is program management burnout. The ACRI program 
manager specifically identified the potential of burnout in his program management team due to 
the repeated, intense Integration phases. To investigate the possibility and severity of this risk to 
RCIP implementation, the total required (but not necessarily provided) government program-
management workforce size was simulated for the ARCI program, RCIP without implementation 
risks, and RCIP with implementation risks (Figure 17). Figure 17 clearly shows the spikes in 
demand for program management during the Integration phases for all three simulations. Notice 
that the peaks are significantly higher for both RCIP simulations than for the ACRI simulation. 
This suggests that the burnout risk will be larger for RCIP than it was for ACRI. Successfully 
implementing a sustainable RCIP program will require a method to address potential burnout of 
the government program-management workforce.  












0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21
1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (weeks)
Required total Govt PM workforce : ARCI person1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Required total Govt PM workforce : RCIP Opportunity person2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Required total Govt PM workforce : RCIP Challenges person3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3  
Figure 17. Simulated Total Required Government Program-management  
Workforce: ARCI, RCIP without and with Implementation Risks 
Managing RCIP Implementation Risks 
The RCIP’s implementation risks can be managed through the careful design of its 
processes, organizations, and their interactions. Specific recommendations based on the ARCI 
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Scope Scope with 
possible flexibility in 
cost 
1) Improve user-acquisition 
coordination to facilitate scope 
flexibility 
2) Operationalize ARCI 
management of solution 
acquisition to make RCIP 
responsive to warfighter priorities 
 
Conclusions 
The Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (ARCI) program was studied as the basis for 
modeling the planned Rapid Capability Insertion Process (RCIP) approach for continuous, 
reduced-cost upgrading of warfighting assets. ARCI used atypical methods in the face of 
atypical program requirements and conditions. ACRI was very successful in improving 
performance quickly for reduced costs. A previously developed acquisition program model was 
adapted to reflect ARCI and used for model validation. This model was then changed to reflect 
the basic conditions expected in RCIP programs. The model demonstrated the potential of RCIP 
to improve program performance. However, implementation risks were identified that may 
degrade potential performance, including increased oversight, the use of more new 
development, and the resulting integration scope and risk. When incorporated into the model, 
these risks were shown to significantly decrease RCIP performance. The means for 
successfully managing the RCIP design based on the ACRI program and RCIP operations are 
suggested for use in addressing the identified implementation risks  
Based on the work described above, we conclude that RCIP has great potential to 
improve acquisition. But the failure to identify and successfully address implementation risks, in 
particular, can significantly constrain RCIP program performance. Special attention must be 
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paid in the design of the RCIP approach to the differences between the ACRI program and the 
features, characteristics, and environmental conditions that RCIP programs will face. The five 
principles, concepts and tools and methods embodied in the Navy’s Open Architecture 
approach to acquisition are likely to be particularly useful in developing RCIP and addressing its 
implementation risks. Many Open Architecture concepts were used successfully in the ACRI 
program, including modular design, design disclosure, interoperability, lifecycle affordability, and 
lots of vigorous (and vigorously managed) competition to generate a wide range of possible 
solutions from many sources. Applying Open Architecture required strong, assertive, 
government program management but provided the basis for extraordinary success. Similar 
extraordinary success is possible in RCIP programs but will also require a process based on 
Open Architecture and vigorous and assertive management by the government. By doing so, 
RCIP can become an example of effective and efficient acquisition for widespread adoption to 
many acquisition efforts.   
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